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Abstract—User authentication is a key service, especially 
for systems that can be considered critical for the data stored 
and the functionalities offered. In those cases, traditional 
authentication mechanisms can be inadequate to face 
intrusions: they usually verify user’s identity only at login, and 
even repeating this step, frequently asking for passwords or 
PIN would reduce system’s usability. Biometric continuous 
authentication, instead, is emerging as viable alternative 
approach that can guarantee accurate and transparent 
verification for the entire session: the traits can be repeatedly 
acquired avoiding disturbing the user’s activity. Another 
security service that these systems may need is non-
repudiation, which protect against the denial of having used 
the system or executed some commands with it. The paper 
focuses on biometric continuous authentication and non-
repudiation, and it briefly presents a preliminary solution 
based on a specific case study. This work presents the current 
research direction of the author and describes some challenges 
that the student aims to address in the next years.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In cyber-physical systems, preventing unauthorized 
access can avoid undesirable consequences or even 
catastrophes, and it is true especially when the system is 
considered highly critical. Traditionally, users’ 
authentication is based on pairs of username and password 
and performed as a single-occurrence process, only at login 
phase. Instead, if the operation covers a long period, it may 
be necessary to repeat the authentication procedure. 
However, asking for passwords or PINs many times requires 
users’ active participation and it may disturb their main 
activity. To address this problem and avoid unauthorized 
access of ICT systems, many solutions based on biometric 
continuous authentication have been studied in the state of 
the art. Those solutions modify user identity verification 
from a one-shot procedure to a continuous process [1], [2]. 
In addition, with appropriate sensors and algorithms, 
biometric traits can be acquired transparently, thus avoiding 
reducing system’s usability.  
Demonstrating user involvement in the usage of a system 
or application can also be useful. In fact, when a controversy 
arises or a disaster happens people may try to deny their 
involvement and to repudiate their behavior. In those 
situations, a non-repudiation mechanism should guarantee 
the establishment of the facts even in front of a court of law. 
Therefore, a non-repudiation service can be useful both as a 
mean to obtain accountability as well as a deterrent for 
deliberate misbehaviors.  
This paper presents the research plan of a first year Ph.D. 
student for the upcoming years. The objective of the research 
direction identified is to study, define and possibly test 
mechanisms that can offer authentication and non-
repudiation, with the aim to provide reliable security 
services for critical systems.  
II. BIOMETRIC CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION AND THE  
CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS CASE STUDY 
Human workers of control rooms are often responsible 
of executing critical commands, and in charge of managing 
privacy-sensitive information. The security of this 
workplace should be granted in order to prevent the 
intervention of insiders: they may benefit of their position in 
the control room to fool colleagues, and gain access to 
machines or accounts. In our previous work [3], we 
proposed an authentication system for deterring and 
detecting malicious access to the workstations of control 
rooms. Specifically tailored for people working in a crisis 
management system control room, the solution aims to 
guarantee authentication and, if possible, non-repudiation of 
operators, reducing the risk that unauthorized personnel 
(including intruders) misuse a workstation. We developed a 
continuous multi-biometric authentication mechanism in 
which biometric data is transparently acquired from the 
operator and continuously verified. More details about the 
protocol, the architecture, the algorithm for trust level 
computation, the prototype realized, and the software 
implemented can be found in [3]. 
A. Usability Assessment and Security Trade-offs 
To investigate the usability of the system, we are 
conducting experiments involving a wide group of 
participants. The users will complete four tasks on a 
workstation provided with our continuous authentication 
application running in background. First, we want to 
measure the effectiveness of our solution calculating the 
FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and the FRR (False Rejection 
Rate) for each of the biometric subsystem and for the main 
biometric continuous authentication system. 
Then, we are going to measure the efficiency of the 
system, tracking the time when the user performs the initial 
authentication and when the session terminates 
unexpectedly. Similarly, we are interested in the time 
necessary to the authentication system to reject an impostor 
that gains possession of a workstation left unattended.  
The satisfaction will be measured with a questionnaire 
we designed to gather users’ opinions and comments about 
their interaction with the system. In addition to the usability 
assessment, we want to clarify if the overhead introduced by 
our continuous authentication system can slow down the 
workstation and consequently increase the users’ required 
effort. Another main goal is to perform the specified 
measurements with different system’s configurations, e.g. 
varying the trust threshold (the minimum trust level allowed 
to remain authenticated).  Finally, we are going to conduct a 
threat analysis and risk assessment for the biometric 
continuous authentication protocol, to establish its strengths, 
weaknesses and consequently understand where 
improvements are needed.  
III. NON-REPUDIATION 
Explanatory tests show that with our solution for 
continuous authentication, the authenticity of control room 
operators is guaranteed. However, although with this 
solution it appears very hard for the user to deny having 
accessed the system, the deniability is related to error rates: 
is an intruder still able to repudiate actions?  
 Trying to directly addressing this problem, we aim to 
discuss if a continuous authentication mechanism, based on 
the usage of biometric traits, provides sufficient undeniable 
evidence of user’s participation in an action. 
Repudiation can be defined as the denial in having 
participated in all or part of an action by one of the entities 
involved. Consequently non-repudiation is the ability to 
protect against denial by one of the entities involved in an 
action of having participated in all or part the action [9], 
[10].   
The motivation for non-repudiation services can be the 
possibility that involved entities may try to cheat each other. 
Non-repudiation services are usually applied in the 
transactions domain. However, there can be other scenarios 
in which non-repudiation may be useful. What the service 
should generate in all the scenarios is undeniable evidence 
that can be used if a dispute arises.  
A. Biometrics Can Guarantee Non-Repudiation? 
Despite biometric traits are sometimes presented in the 
computer security literature as an authentication factor that 
may solve the repudiation problem [4], [5], other works like 
[6], and [7] draw completely different conclusions. 
Analyzing the state of the art, we can state that the answers 
to this question are contradictory.  
However, the situation changes if biometric 
authentication is coupled with another security mechanism 
like digital signature, which is commonly considered as the 
standard approach to achieve non-repudiation.  In fact, 
public key infrastructure, or PKI, and biometrics can well 
complement each other in many security applications [8]. 
Our idea is to study authentication and non-repudiation 
in order to provide them in different scenarios and 
eventually involving biometric traits.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
Security is a fundamental property in the ICT field, 
especially for critical systems and applications in which 
confidential data are managed and where unauthorized 
accesses and behaviors can cause undesirable consequences 
or even catastrophes. In this context, authentication and 
non-repudiation are common requirements. The aim of our 
research is to study approaches to guarantee them. First, we 
are planning to integrate an existing biometric continuous 
authentication mechanism [2] with a non-repudiation 
service.  In addition, we plan to identify mechanisms for 
providing non-repudiation, specific for various contexts and 
their related issues, requirements and involved entities. 
Finally, another ongoing activity consists in 
investigating if biometrics-based solutions permit to obtain 
irrefutable evidence of user identity: for different scenarios 
we will study which biometric trait –single or combined- 
can be appropriate, also considering the error rates that may 
be admissible, the technological or environmental 
limitations and the user acceptability.  
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